Rêveberiya Xweser a Bakur û Rojhilatê Sûriyeyê(Kurdish) الإدارة الذاتية لشمال وشرق سوريا(Arabic) ܡܕܰܒܪܳܢܘܬ݂ܳܐ ܝܳܬ݂ܰܝܬܳܐ ܠܓܰܪܒܝܳܐ ܘܡܰܕܢܚܳܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܰܐ(Classical Syriac) Kuzey ve Doğu Suriye Özerk Yönetimi(Turkish)
^ The region has not adopted an official flag. However, several flags have been used to represent the entity in official settings. See Flag of Northern Syria for more.
^ Including all SDF-controlled territory ruled by affiliated civilian councils.[4]
On 17 March 2016, its de facto administration self-declared the establishment of a federal system of government as the Democratic Federation of Rojava – Northern Syria (Kurdish: Federaliya Demokratîk a Rojava – Bakurê Sûriyê; Arabic: الفدرالية الديمقراطية لروج آفا – شمال سوريا, translit.al-Fidirāliyya al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya li-Rūj ʾĀvā – Šamāl Suriyā; Classical Syriac: ܦܕܪܐܠܝܘܬ݂ܐ ܕܝܡܩܪܐܛܝܬܐ ܠܓܙܪܬܐ ܒܓܪܒܝܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܐ, translit. Federaloyotho Demoqraṭoyto l'Gozarto b'Garbyo d'Suriya; sometimes abbreviated as NSR).[28][29][30][31]
The updated December 2016 constitution of the polity uses the name Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (Kurdish: Federaliya Demokratîk a Bakûrê Sûriyê; Arabic: الفدرالية الديمقراطية لشمال سوريا, translit.al-Fidirāliyya al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya li-Šamāl Suriyā; Classical Syriac: ܦܕܪܐܠܝܘܬ݂ܐ ܕܝܡܩܪܐܛܝܬܐ ܕܓܪܒܝ ܣܘܪܝܐ, translit. Federaloyotho Demoqraṭoyto d'Garbay Suriya).[32][33][34][35]
Since 6 September 2018, the Syrian Democratic Council has adopted a new name for the region, naming it the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES) (Kurdish: Rêveberiya Xweser a Bakur û Rojhilatê Sûriyeyê; Arabic: الإدارة الذاتية لشمال وشرق سوريا; Classical Syriac: ܡܕܰܒܪܳܢܘܬ݂ܳܐ ܝܳܬ݂ܰܝܬܳܐ ܠܓܰܪܒܝܳܐ ܘܡܰܕܢܚܳܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܰܐ, translit. Mdabronuṯo Yoṯayto l-Garbyo w-Madnḥyo d-Suriya; Turkish: Kuzey ve Doğu Suriye Özerk Yönetimi), encompassing the Euphrates, Afrin, and Jazira regions as well as the local civil councils in the regions of Raqqa, Manbij, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor.[36][37][38][39]
The region's administration is sometimes also referred to as the "Democratic Autonomous Administration" (DAA).[40]
The Euphrates near Halabiye; the archaeological site Zalabiye can be seen in the background on the left bank.
The region lies to the west of the Tigris along the Turkish border and borders Iraqi Kurdistan to the southeast. All regions are at latitude approximately 36°30' north and are all relatively flat except for the Kurd Mountains in the Afrin Region, which are now outside of the region's de facto control.
Having been part of the Fertile Crescent, Northern Syria has several Neolithic sites such as Tell Halaf.
Ruins of the "Red House" of Dūr-Katlimmu exposed by excavations (6th century AD)
Northern Syria is part of the Fertile Crescent, and includes archaeological sites dating to the Neolithic, such as Tell Halaf. In antiquity, the area was part of the Mitanni kingdom, its centre being the Khabur river valley in modern-day Jazira Region. It was then part of Assyria, with the last surviving Assyrian imperial records, from between 604 BC and 599 BC, were found in and around the Assyrian city of Dūr-Katlimmu.[41] Later it was ruled by the Achaemenids, Hellenes, Artaxiads,[42]Romans, Parthians,[43]Sasanians,[44]Byzantines and successive Arab Islamic caliphates.
Kurdish settlement in Syria goes back to before the Crusades of the 11th century. A number of Kurdish military and feudal settlements from before this period have been found in Syria. Such settlements have been found in the Alawite and north Lebanese mountains and around Hama and its surroundings. The Crusade fortress of Krak des Chevaliers, which is known in Arabic as Hisn al-Akrad (Castle of the Kurds), was originally a Kurdish military settlement before it was enlarged by the French Crusaders. Similarly, the Kurd-Dagh (Kurdish Mount) has been inhabited by Kurds for more than a millennium.[45]
In the 12th century, Kurdish and other Muslim regiments accompanied Saladin, who was a Kurd from Tikrit, on his conquest of the Middle East and establishment of the Ayyubid dynasty (1171–1341), which was administered from Damascus. The Kurdish regiments that accompanied Saladin established self-ruled areas in and around Damascus. These settlements evolved into the Kurdish sections of Damascus of Hayy al-Akrad (the Kurdish quarter) and the Salhiyya districts located in the north-east of Damasacus on Mount Qasioun.[46] The Kurdish community’s role in the military continued under the Ottomans. Kurdish soldiers and policemen from city were tasked with both maintaining order and protecting the pilgrims’ route toward Mecca. Many Kurds from Syria’s rural hinterland joined the local Janissary corp in Damascus. Later, Kurdish migrants from diverse areas, such as Diyarbakir, Mosul and Kirkuk, also joined these military units which caused an expansion of the Kurdish community in the city.[47]
During the Ottoman Empire (1516–1922), large Kurdish-speaking tribal groups both settled in and were deported to areas of northern Syria from Anatolia. The demographics of this area underwent a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century. Some Circassian, Kurdish and Chechen tribes cooperated with the Ottoman (Turkish) authorities in the massacres of Armenian and Assyrian Christians in Upper Mesopotamia, between 1914 and 1920, with further attacks on unarmed fleeing civilians conducted by local Arab militias.[48][49][50][51] Many Assyrians fled to Syria during the genocide and settled mainly in the Jazira area.[50][52][53] Starting in 1926, the region saw another immigration of Kurds following the failure of the Sheikh Said rebellion against the Turkish authorities.[54] While many of the Kurds in Syria have been there for centuries, waves of Kurds fled their homes in Turkey and settled in Syria, where they were granted citizenship by the French mandate authorities.[55] In the 1930s and 1940s, the region saw several failed autonomy movements.
Under Syrian rule, policies of Arab nationalism and attempts at forced Arabization have been widespread in Northern Syria, to a large part directed against the Kurdish population.[56] The region received little investment or development from the central government and laws discriminated against Kurds owning property, driving cars, working in certain professions and forming political parties.[57] Property was routinely confiscated by government loansharks. Kurdish language education was forbidden, compromising Kurdish students' education.[58][59] Hospitals lacked equipment for advanced treatment and instead patients had to be transferred outside the region. Numerous place names were Arabized in the 1960s and 1970s.[59][60] In his report for the 12th session of the UN Human Rights Council titled Persecution and Discrimination against Kurdish Citizens in Syria, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights held that "Successive Syrian governments continued to adopt a policy of ethnic discrimination and national persecution against Kurds, completely depriving them of their national, democratic and human rights – an integral part of human existence. The government imposed ethnically-based programs, regulations and exclusionary measures on various aspects of Kurds’ lives – political, economic, social and cultural."[61]
In many instances, the Syrian government arbitrarily deprived ethnic Kurdish citizens of their citizenship. The largest such instance was a consequence of a census in 1962, which was conducted for exactly this purpose. 120,000 ethnic Kurdish citizens saw their citizenship arbitrarily taken away and became stateless.[56][62] Kurdish private schools were banned.[56][63] This status was passed to the children of a "stateless" Kurdish father.[56] In 2010, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimated the number of such "stateless" Kurdish people in Syria at 300,000.[64]
In 1973, the Syrian authorities confiscated 750 square kilometres (290 square miles) of fertile agricultural land in Al-Hasakah Governorate, which was owned and cultivated by tens of thousands of Kurdish citizens, and gave it to Arab families brought in from other provinces.[61][63] In 2007, in the Al-Hasakah Governorate, 600 square kilometres (230 square miles) around Al-Malikiyah were granted to Arab families, while tens of thousands of Kurdish inhabitants of the villages concerned were evicted.[61] These and other expropriations was part of the so-called "Arab Belt initiative" which aimed to change the demographic fabric of the resource-rich region.[56]
In March 2016, Hediya Yousef and Mansur Selum were elected co-chairpersons for the executive committee to organise a constitution for the region, to replace the 2014 constitution.[2] Yousef said the decision to set up a federal government was in large part driven by the expansion of territories captured from Islamic State: "Now, after the liberation of many areas, it requires us to go to a wider and more comprehensive system that can embrace all the developments in the area, that will also give rights to all the groups to represent themselves and to form their own administrations."[69] In July 2016, a draft for the new constitution was presented, based on the principles of the 2014 constitution, mentioning all ethnic groups living in Northern Syria and addressing their cultural, political and linguistic rights.[1][70] The main political opposition to the constitution have been Kurdish nationalists, in particular the KNC, who have different ideological aspirations than the TEV-DEM coalition.[71] On 28 December 2016, after a meeting of the 151-member Syrian Democratic Council in Rmelan, a new constitution was resolved; despite objections by 12 Kurdish parties, the region was renamed the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, removing the name "Rojava".[72]
The political system of the region is based on its adopted constitution, officially titled "Charter of the Social Contract".[16][73] The constitution was ratified on 9 January 2014; it provides that all residents of the region shall enjoy fundamental rights such as gender equality and freedom of religion.[16] It also provides for property rights.[74] The region's system of community government has direct democratic aspirations.[75]
"For a former diplomat like me, I found it confusing: I kept looking for a hierarchy, the singular leader, or signs of a government line, when, in fact, there was none; there were just groups. There was none of that stifling obedience to the party, or the obsequious deference to the 'big man'—a form of government all too evident just across the borders, in Turkey to the north, and the Kurdish regional government of Iraq to the south. The confident assertiveness of young people was striking."
The politics of the region has been described as having "libertarian transnational aspirations" influenced by the PKK's shift toward anarchism, but also includes various "tribal, ethno-sectarian, capitalist and patriarchal structures."[74] The region has a "co-governance" policy in which each position at each level of government in the region includes a "female equivalent of equal authority" to a male.[16] Similarly, there are aspirations for equal political representation of all ethno-religious components – Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians being the most sizeable ones. Some have compared this to the Lebaneseconfessionalist system, which is based on that country's major religions.[74][79][80][81][80]
Article 8 of the 2014 constitution stipulates that "All Cantons in the autonomous regions are founded on the principle of local self-government. Cantons may freely elect their representatives and representative bodies, and may pursue their rights insofar as it does not contravene the articles of the Charter."[73]
The cantons were later reorganized into regions with subordinate cantons/provinces, areas, districts and communes. The first communal elections in the region under the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria system were held on 22 September 2017. 12,421 candidates competed for around 3,700 communal positions during the elections, which were organized by the region's High Electoral Commission.[82][83]
Elections for the councils of the Jazira Region, Euphrates Region and Afrin Region were held in December 2017.[5]
On 6 September 2018, during a meeting of the Syrian Democratic Council in Ayn Issa, a new name for the region was adopted, the "Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria", encompassing the Euphrates, Afrin, and Jazira regions as well as the local civil councils in the regions of Raqqa, Manbij, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor. During the meeting, a 70-member "General Council for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria" was formed.[36][37][38]
In December 2015, during a meeting of the region's representatives in Al-Malikiyah, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) was established to serve as the political representative of the Syrian Democratic Forces.[84] The co-leaders selected to lead the SDC at its founding were prominent human rights activist Haytham Manna and TEV-DEM Executive Board member Îlham Ehmed.[85][86] The SDC appoints an Executive Council which deal with the economy, agriculture, natural resources, and foreign affairs.[87] General elections were planned for 2014 and 2018,[87] but this was postponed due to fighting. Among other stipulations outlined is a quota of 40% for women’s participation in government, and quota for youth. In connection with a decision to introduce affirmative action for ethnic minorities, all governmental organizations and offices are based on a co-presidential system.[88]
Under the rule of the Ba'ath Party, school education consisted of only Arabic language public schools, supplemented by Assyrian private confessional schools.[89] In 2015, the region's administration introduced primary education in the native language (either Kurdish or Arabic) and mandatory bilingual education (Kurdish and Arabic) for public schools,[90][91] with English as a mandatory third language.[92] There are ongoing disagreements and negotiations over curriculums with the Syrian central government,[93] which generally still pays the teachers in public schools.[94][95][96]
In August 2016, the Ourhi Centre was founded by the Assyrian community in the city of Qamishli, to educate teachers in order to make Syriac-Aramaic an additional language in public schools in Jazira Region,[97] which then started in the 2016/17 academic year.[93] According to the region's Education Committee, in 2016/2017 "three curriculums have replaced the old one, to include teaching in three languages: Kurdish, Arabic and Syriac."[98] In August 2017 Galenos Yousef Issa of the Ourhi Centre announced that the Syriac curriculum would be expanded to grade 6, which earlier had been limited to grade 3, with teachers being assigned to Syriac schools in Al-Hasakah, Al-Qahtaniyah and Al-Malikiyah.[99][100] At the start of the academic year 2018–2019, the curricula in Kurdish and Arabic had been expanded to grades 1–12 and Syriac to grades 1–9. "Jineology" classes had also been introduced.[101]
The federal, regional and local administrations in the region put much emphasis on promoting libraries and educational centers, to facilitate learning and social and artistic activities. Examples are the Nahawand Center for Developing Children’s Talents in Amuda (est. 2015) and the Rodî û Perwîn Library in Kobani (May 2016).[102]
For Assyrian private confessional schools there had at first been no changes.[93][103] However, in August 2018 it was reported that the region's authorities was trying to implement its own Syriac curriculum in private Christian schools that have been continuing to use an Arabic curriculum with limited Syriac classes approved by the Assad regime and originally developed by Syrian Education Ministry in cooperation with Christian clergy in the 1950s. The threatening of the closure of schools not complying with this resulted in protests erupting in Qamishli.[104][105][106] A deal was later reached in September 2018 between the region's authorities and the local Syriac Orthodox archbishopric, where the two first grades in these schools would learn the region's Syriac curriculum and grades three to six would continue to learn the Damascus approved curriculum.[107][108]
While there was no institution of tertiary education on the territory of the region at the onset of the Syrian Civil War, an increasing number of such institutions have been established by the regional administrations in the region since.
In August 2015, the traditionally-designed University of Afrin in Afrin started teaching, with initial programs in literature, engineering and economics, including institutes for medicine, topographic engineering, music and theater, business administration and the Kurdish language.[110]
In July 2016, Jazira Canton Board of Education started the University of Rojava in Qamishli, with faculties for Medicine, Engineering, Sciences, and Arts and Humanities. Programs taught include health, oil, computer and agricultural engineering; physics, chemistry, history, psychology, geography, mathematics and primary school teaching and Kurdish literature.[102][111] Its language of instruction is Kurdish, and with an agreement with Paris 8 University in France for cooperation, the university opened registration for students in the academic year 2016–2017.[112]
In August 2016 Jazira Canton police forces took control of the remaining parts of Hasakah city, which included the Hasakah campus of the Arabic-language Al-Furat University, and with mutual agreement the institution continues to be operated under the authority of the Damascus government's Ministry of Higher Education.
Internet connections in the region are often slow due to inadequate infrastructure. Internet lines are operated by Syrian Telecom, which as of January 2017 is working on a major extension of the fibre optic cable network in southern Jazira Region.[117]
After the establishment of the de facto autonomous region, the Center of Art and Democratic Culture, located in Jazira Region, has become a venue for aspiring artists who showcase their work.[118][119] Among major cultural events in the region is the annual Festival of Theater in March/April as well as the Rojava Short Story Festival in June, both in the city of Qamishli, and the Afrin Short Film Festival in April.[120]
The Jazira Region is a major wheat and cotton producer and has a considerable oil industry. The Euphrates Region suffered most destruction of the three regions and has huge challenges in reconstruction, and has recently seen some greenhouse agriculture construction. The Afrin Region have had a traditional specialization on olive oil including Aleppo soap made from it, and had drawn much industrial production from the nearby city of Aleppo due to longstanding civil war fighting in that city. Price controls are managed by local committees, which can set the price of basic goods such as food and medical goods.[121]
It has been theorized that the Assad government had deliberately underdeveloped parts of Northern Syria for the purposes of Arabization of the region as well as making secession attempts less likely.[122] During the Syrian Civil War, the infrastructure of the region has on average experienced less destruction than other parts of Syria. In May 2016, Ahmed Yousef, head of the Economic Body and chairman of Afrin University, claimed that at the time, the economic output of the region (including agriculture, industry and oil) accounted for about 55% of Syria's gross domestic product.[123] In 2014, the Syrian government was still paying some state employees,[124] but fewer than before.[125] The administration of the region has however stated that "none of our projects are financed by the regime".[126]
There were at first no direct or indirect taxes on people or businesses in the region; the administration raises money through tariffs and through selling oil and other natural resources.[127][121] However in July 2017, it was reported that the administration in the Jazira Region had started to collect income tax to provide for public services in the region.[128] In May 2016, The Wall Street Journal reported that traders in Syria experience the region as "the one place where they aren't forced to pay bribes."[129]
The main sources of revenue for the autonomous region has been presented as: 1. Income from public properties such as grain silos as well as from oil and gas in the Jazira Region, 2. Income from local taxation and customs fees taken at the border crossings, 3. Income from service delivery, 4. Finances sent from expats in Iraq and Turkey and 5. Local donations. In 2015 the autonomous administration of the region shared information regarding the region's finances in which the total amount of revenue for the year of 2014 for the autonomous administration was about 3 billion Syrian Pounds (~5.8 million USD) from which 50% was spent on "self-defense and protection", 18% for the Jazira Canton (now Jazira Region), 8.5% for the Kobani Canton (now Euphrates Region), 8.5% for the Afrin Canton (now Afrin Region), 15% for the "Internal Committee" and any remainder as a reserve for use in the following year.[40]
Oil and food production is substantial,[87] so they are important exports. Agricultural products include sheep, grain and cotton. Important imports are consumer goods and auto parts.[130] The border crossing with Iraqi Kurdistan has been intermittently closed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but is open since June 2016.[131][132] Trade with Turkey and access to humanitarian and military aid is difficult due to a blockade by Turkey.[133] Turkey does not allow businesspeople or goods to cross its border.[134][126] The blockade from adjacent territories controlled by Turkey and ISIL, and partially also the KRG, has temporarily caused heavy distortions of relative prices in Jazira Region and Euphrates Region (while separate Afrin Region since February 2016 meets Syrian government controlled territory); for example in Jazira Region and Euphrates Region, through 2016 petrol cost only half as much as bottled water.[135]
However, since the permanent opening of the border crossing with Iraqi Kurdistan in June 2016,[131] and the establishment of a corridor between Syrian government controlled territory and Jazira Region and Euphrates Region in April 2017,[136] economic exchange has normalized and contributes to economic activity. Further, in May 2017 in northern Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces fighting ISIL conquered a corridor connecting Rojava and Iraqi government-controlled territory.[137][138][139]
The autonomous administration is supporting efforts for workers to form cooperatives, such as this sewing cooperative in Derik.
The autonomous region is ruled by a coalition which bases its policy ambitions to a large extent on the libertarian socialist ideology of Abdullah Öcalan and have been described as pursuing a model of economy that blends co-operative and private enterprise.[140] In 2012, the PYD launched what it called the "Social Economy Plan", later renamed the "People's Economy Plan" (PEP). [141]Private property and entrepreneurship are protected under the principle of "ownership by use". Dr. Dara Kurdaxi, a regional official, has stated: "The method in Rojava is not so much against private property, but rather has the goal of putting private property in the service of all the peoples who live in Rojava."[142] Communes and co-operatives have been established to provide essentials.[143] Co-operatives account for a large proportion of agricultural production and are active in construction, factories, energy production, livestock, pistachio and roasted seeds, and public markets.[140] Several hundred instances of collective farming have occurred across towns and villages in the region, with communes consisting of approximately 20–35 people.[144] According to the region's "Ministry of Economics", approximately three quarters of all property has been placed under community ownership and a third of production has been transferred to direct management by workers' councils.[145]
Syrian civil laws are valid in the region if they do not conflict with the Constitution of the autonomous region. One notable example for amendment is personal status law, which in Syria is based on Sharia[146] and applied by Sharia Courts,[147] while the secular The autonomous region proclaims absolute equality of women under the law, allowing civil marriage and banning forced marriage, polygamy[14] and underage marriage.[148][12]
A new criminal justice approach was implemented that emphasizes restoration over retribution.[149] The death penalty was abolished.[150] Prisons house mostly people charged with terrorist activity related to ISIL and other extremist groups.[151] A September 2015 report of Amnesty International noted that 400 people were incarcerated by the region's authorities and criticized deficiencies in due process of the judicial system of the region.[152][16][153]
The justice system in the region is influenced by Abdullah Öcalan's libertarian socialist ideology. At the local level, citizens create Peace and Consensus Committees, which make group decisions on minor criminal cases and disputes as well as in separate committees resolve issues of specific concern to women's rights like domestic violence and marriage. At the regional level, citizens (who need not be trained jurists) are elected by the regional People's Councils to serve on seven-member People's Courts. At the next level are four Appeals Courts, composed of trained jurists. The court of last resort is the Regional Court, which serves the region as a whole. Separate from this system, the Constitutional Court renders decisions on compatibility of acts of government and legal proceedings with the constitution of the DFNS (called the Social Contract).[150]
Policing in the region is performed by the Asayish armed formation. Asayish was established on July 25, 2013 to fill the gap of security when the Syrian security forces withdrew.[154] Under the Constitution of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, policing is a competence of the regions. The Asayish forces of the regions are composed of 26 official bureaus that aim to provide security and solutions to social problems. The six main units of Asayish are Checkpoints Administration, Anti-Terror Forces Command (HAT), Intelligence Directorate, Organized Crime Directorate, Traffic Directorate and Treasury Directorate. 218 Asayish centers were established and 385 checkpoints with 10 Asayish members in each checkpoint were set up. 105 Asayish offices provide security against ISIL on the frontlines across Northern Syria. Larger cities have general directorates responsible for all aspects of security including road controls. Each region has a HAT command, and each Asayish center organizes itself autonomously.[154]
Throughout the region, the municipal Civilian Defense Forces (HPC)[155] and the regional Self-Defense Forces (HXP)[156] also serve local-level security. In Jazira Region, the Asayish are further complemented by the Assyrian Sutoro police force, which is organized in every area with Assyrian population, provides security and solutions to social problems in collaboration with other Asayish units.[154] The Khabour Guards and Nattoreh, though not police units, also have a presence in the area, providing security in towns along the Khabur River. The Bethnahrain Women's Protection Forces also maintain a police branch. In the areas taken from ISIL during the Raqqa campaign, the Raqqa Internal Security Forces and Manbij Internal Security Forces operate as police forces. Deir ez-Zor also maintain an Internal Security Forces unit.
Northern Syria Internal Security Forces is an umbrella terms for internal security forces (minus Sutoro and the police branch of Bethnahrain Women's Protection Forces)
The Self-Defence Forces (HXP) is a territorial defense militia and the only conscript armed force in the region. HXP is locally recruited to garrison their municipal area and is under the responsibility and command of the respective regions of the DFNS. Occasionally, HXP units have supported the YPG, and SDF in general, during combat operations against ISIL outside their own municipality and region.
In the course of the Syrian Civil War, militias associated with the DFNS have been accused of war crimes, in particular members of the People's Protection Units (YPG), including 2014 and 2015 reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, both of which operate freely in the region.[158][159] The claims from 2014 include claims of arbitrary arrests and torture, other claims include the use of child soldiers.[160][161][162][163] In October 2015 the YPG demobilized 21 minors from the military service in its ranks.[164] Accusations have been comprehensively debated and contested by both the YPG and other human rights organizations.[165][166] YPG members since September 2015 receive human rights training from Geneva Call and other international organizations.[167]
Some persistent issues under the region's administration concern ethnic minority rights. One issue of contention is the consequence of the Baathist Syrian government's settling of Arab tribal settlers, expropriated for the purpose from its previous Kurdish owners in 1973 and 2007,[61][56][63] There have been calls to expel the settlers and return the land to their previous owners, which has led the political leadership of the region to press the Syrian government for a comprehensive solution.[173]
The demographics of the region have historically been highly diverse. One major shift in modern times was in the early part of the 20th century due to the Assyrian and Armenian Genocides, when many Assyrians and Armenians fled to Syria from Turkey. This was followed by many Kurds fleeing Turkey in the aftermath of Sheikh Said rebellion. Another major shift in modern times was the Baath policy of settling additional Arab tribes in Northern Syria. Most recently, during the Syrian Civil War, many refugees have fled to the north of the country. Some ethnic Arab citizens from Iraq have fled to Northern Syria as well.[171][174][175] However, as of January 2018, only two million people are estimated to remain in the area under the region's administration with estimates of around half a million people emigrating since the beginning of the civil war, to a large degree because of the economic hardships the region has faced during the war.[3]
Two ethnic groups have a significant presence throughout Northern Syria:
Kurds are an ethnic group[176] living in northeastern and northwestern Syria, culturally and linguistically classified among the Iranian peoples.[177][178][179] Many Kurds consider themselves descended from the ancient Iranian people of the Medes,[180] using a calendar dating from 612 B.C., when the Assyrian capital of Nineveh was conquered by the Medes.[181] Kurds formed 55% of the 2010 population of what now is both Jazira Region and Euphrates Region.[122] During the Syrian civil war, many Kurds who had lived elsewhere in Syria fled back to their traditional lands in Northern Syria.
Two ethnic groups have a significant presence in certain regions of Northern Syria:
The streets of Qamishli during Christmas
Assyrians are an ethnoreligious group.[192][193] Their presence in Syria is in the Jazira Region of the DFNS, particularly in the urban areas (Qamishli, al-Hasakah, Ras al-Ayn, Al-Malikiyah, Al-Qahtaniyah), in the northeastern corner and in villages along the Khabur River in the Tell Tamer area. They traditionally speak varieties of Syriac-Aramaic, a Semitic language.[194] There are many Assyrians among recent refugees to Northern Syria, fleeing Islamist violence elsewhere in Syria back to their traditional lands.[195] In the secular polyethnic political climate of the DFNS, the Dawronoye modernization movement has a growing influence on Assyrian identity in the 21st century.[13]
Regarding the status of different languages in the autonomous region, its "Social Contract" stipulates that "all languages in Northern Syria are equal in all areas of life, including social, educational, cultural, and administrative dealings. Every people shall organize its life and manage its affairs using its mother tongue."[196] In practice, Arabic and Kurmanji are predominantly used across all areas and for most official documents, with Syriac being mainly used in the Jazira Region with some usage across all areas while Turkish and Circassian are also used in the region of Manbij.
The four main languages spoken in Northern Syria are the following, and are from three different language families:
This list includes all cities and towns in the region with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The population figures are given according to the 2004 Syrian census.[200] Cities highlighted in light grey are partially controlled by the Damascus government.[201][202][203][204]
Currently, the relations of the region to the Damascus government are determined by the context of the Syrian civil war. The Constitution of Syria and the Constitution of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria are legally incompatible with respect to legislative and executive authority. In the military realm, combat between the People's Protection Units (YPG) and Syrian government forces has been rare, in the most notable instances some of the territory still controlled by the Syrian government in Qamishli and al-Hasakah has been lost to the YPG. In some military campaigns, in particular in northern Aleppo governate and in al-Hasakah, YPG and Syrian government forces have tacitly cooperated against Islamist forces, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and others.[9]
The region does not claim to pursue full independence but rather autonomy within a federal and democratic Syria.[20] In July 2016, Constituent Assembly co-chair Hediya Yousef formulated the region's approach towards Syria as follows:[206]
We believe that a federal system is ideal form of governance for Syria. We see that in many parts of the world, a federal framework enables people to live peacefully and freely within territorial borders. The people of Syria can also live freely in Syria. We will not allow for Syria to be divided; all we want is the democratization of Syria; its citizens must live in peace, and enjoy and cherish the ethnic diversity of the national groups inhabiting the country.
In March 2015, the Syrian Information Minister announced that his government considered recognizing the Kurdish autonomy "within the law and constitution".[207] While the region's administration is not invited to the Geneva III peace talks on Syria,[208] or any of the earlier talks, in particular Russia, which calls for the region's inclusion, does to some degree carry the region's positions into the talks, as documented in Russia's May 2016 draft for a new constitution for Syria.[209] In October 2016, there were reports of a Russian initiative for federalization with a focus on northern Syria, which at its core called to turn the existing institutions of the region into legitimate institutions of Syria; also reported was its rejection for the time being by the Syrian government.[173] The Damascus ruling elite is split over the question whether the new model in the region can work in parallel and converge with the Syrian government, for the benefit of both, or if the agenda should be to centralize again all power at the end of the civil war, necessitating preparation for ultimate confrontation with the region's institutions.[210]
A June 2017 analysis described the region's "relationship with the regime fraught but functional" and a "semi-cooperative dynamic".[211]
In late September 2017, Syria's Foreign Minister said that Damascus would consider granting Kurds more autonomy in the region once ISIL is defeated.[212]
The autonomous region of Rojava, as it exists today, is one of few bright spots – albeit a very bright one – to emerge from the tragedy of the Syrian revolution. Having driven out agents of the Assad regime in 2011, and despite the hostility of almost all of its neighbours, Rojava has not only maintained its independence, but is a remarkable democratic experiment. Popular assemblies have been created as the ultimate decision-making bodies, councils selected with careful ethnic balance (in each municipality, for instance, the top three officers have to include one Kurd, one Arab and one Assyrian or Armenian Christian, and at least one of the three has to be a woman), there are women's and youth councils, and, in a remarkable echo of the armed Mujeres Libres (Free Women) of Spain, a feminist army, the "YJA Star" militia (the "Union of Free Women", the star here referring to the ancient Mesopotamian goddess Ishtar), that has carried out a large proportion of the combat operations against the forces of Islamic State.
Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1992 according to the CIA
The region's dominant political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is a member organisation of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) organisation. As KCK member organisations in the neighbouring states with Kurdish minorities are either outlawed (Turkey, Iran) or politically marginal with respect to other Kurdish parties (Iraq). Expressions of sympathy for Syrian Kurds have been numerous among Kurds in Turkey.[220] During the Siege of Kobanî, some ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey crossed the border and volunteered in the defense of the town.[221][222]
The region's relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is complicated. One context is that the governing party there, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), views itself and its affiliated Kurdish parties in other countries as a more conservative and nationalist alternative and competitor to the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.[20] The political system of Iraqi Kurdistan[223] stands in stark contrast to the region's system. Like the KCK umbrella organization, the PYD has some anti-nationalist ideological leanings while having Kurdish nationalist factions as well.[224] They have traditionally been opposed by the Iraqi-Kurdish KDP-sponsored Kurdish National Council in Syria with more clear Kurdish nationalist leanings.[225]
The region's most notable role in the international arena is comprehensive military cooperation of its militias under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) umbrella with the United States and the international (US-led) coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.[226][227] In a public statement in March 2016, the day after the declaration of the regions autonomy, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter praised the People's Protection Units (YPG) militia as having "proven to be excellent partners of ours on the ground in fighting ISIL. We are grateful for that, and we intend to continue to do that, recognizing the complexities of their regional role."[228]
Late October 2016, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, the commander of the international Anti-ISIL-coalition, said that the SDF would lead the impending assault on Raqqa, ISIL's stronghold and capital, and that SDF commanders would plan the operation with advice from American and coalition troops.[229] At various times, the U.S. deployed U.S. troops embedded with the SDF to the border between the region and Turkey, in order to deter Turkish aggressions against the SDF.[230][231][232][233] In February 2018, the United States Department of Defense released a budget blueprint for 2019 which with respect to the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria included $300 million for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and $250 million for border security.[234] In April 2018, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron dispatched troops to Manbij and Rmelan in a bid to assist Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militias and in order to defuse tensions with Turkey.[235][236]
In the diplomatic field, the de facto autonomous region lacks any formal recognition. While there is comprehensive activity of reception of the region's representatives[237][238][239][240] and appreciation[241] with a broad range of countries, only Russia has on occasion openly and boldly supported the region's political ambition of federalization of Syria in the international arena,[173][209] while the U.S. does not.[242][243] After peace talks between Syrian civil war parties in Astana in January 2017, Russia offered a draft for a future constitution of Syria, which would, among other things, change the "Syrian Arab Republic" into the "Republic of Syria", introduce decentralized authorities as well as elements of federalism like "association areas", strengthen the parliament at the cost of the presidency, and realize secularism by abolishing Islamic jurisprudence as a source of legislation.[244][245][246][247] The Democratic Federation of Northern Syria during 2016 opened official representation offices in Moscow,[248]Stockholm,[249]Berlin,[250]Paris,[251] and The Hague.[252] A broad range of public voices in the U.S. and Europe have called for more formal recognition of the region.[170][171][253][254] Notable international cooperation has been in the field of educational and cultural institutions, like the cooperation agreement of Paris 8 University with the newly founded University of Rojava in Qamishli,[255] or planning for a French cultural centre in Amuda.[256][257][258]
Neighbouring Turkey is consistently hostile, because it feels threatened by the region's emergence, which encourages activism for autonomy among Kurds in Turkey in the Kurdish–Turkish conflict. In this context, in particular the region's leading Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the YPG militia being members of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) network of organisations, which also includes both political and military Kurdish organizations in Turkey itself, including the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey's policy towards the region is based on an economic blockade,[170] persistent attempts of international isolation,[259] opposition to the cooperation between the American-led anti-ISIL coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces,[260] and support of Islamist opposition fighters hostile to the autonomous region,[261][262] with some claims even including ISIL among these.[263][264][265] Turkey has on several occasions militarily attacked the region's territory and defence forces.[266][267][268] This has resulted in some expressions of international solidarity with the region.[269][270][271][272][233][excessive citations]
The autonomous region has made efforts in implementing reforms to protect the ecosystems of Northern Syria and achieve a degree of self-sufficiency. Before the Syrian Civil War, the region had been ecologically damaged by monoculture, oil extraction, damming of rivers, deforestation, drought, topsoil loss and general pollution. The region launched a campaign titled 'Make Rojava Green Again' which is attempting to provide renewable energy to communities (especially solar energy), reforestation, protecting water sources, planting gardens, promoting urban agriculture, creating wildlife reserves, water recycling, beekeeping, expanding public transportation and promoting environmental awareness within their communities.[273]
^Assyria 1995: Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Symposium of the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project / Helsinki, September 7–11, 1995.
^Crook, JA; et al. (1985). The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 9: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 603. ISBN978-1139054379.
^Andrea, Alfred J.; Overfield, James H. (2015). The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Volume I: To 1500 (8 ed.). Cengage Learning. p. 133. ISBN978-1305537460.
^Philip G. Kreyenbroek, Stefan Sperl (1992). The Kurds: a contemporary overview (Reprint. ed.). London: Routledge. p. 114. ISBN0-415-07265-4.
^Yildiz, Kerim (2005). The Kurds in Syria : the forgotten people (1. publ. ed.). London [etc.]: Pluto Press, in association with Kurdish Human Rights Project. p. 25. ISBN0745324991.
^Tejel, Jordi (2008). Syria's Kurds: history, politics and society (1. publ. ed.). London: Routledge. p. 10. ISBN0415424402.
^Travis, Hannibal. Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010, 2007, pp. 237–77, 293–294.
^A Small Key Can Open a Large Door: The Rojava Revolution (1st ed.). Strangers In A Tangled Wilderness. 4 March 2015. According to Dr. Ahmad Yousef, an economic co-minister, three-quarters of traditional private property is being used as commons and one quarter is still being owned by use of individuals...According to the Ministry of Economics, worker councils have only been set up for about one third of the enterprises in Rojava so far.
^"Syria". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 13. Retrieved 2016-11-16.
^Perry, Tom; Malla, Naline (10 September 2015). "Western states train Kurdish force in Syria, force's leader says". Reuters. Amnesty International this month faulted the Kurdish administration for arbitrary detentions and unfair trials.... [Ciwan] Ibrahim said ... efforts were underway to improve its human rights record.... The Geneva Call ... promotes good treatment of civilians in war zones...
^Killing of Iraq Kurds 'genocide', BBC, "The Dutch court said it considered "legally and convincingly proven that the Kurdish population meets requirement under Genocide Conventions as an ethnic group"."
^"Kurds". The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Encyclopedia.com. 2014. Retrieved 29 December 2014.
^Bois, T.; Minorsky, V.; MacKenzie, D.N. (2009). "Kurds, Kurdistan". In Bearman, P.; Bianquis, T.; Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E.; Heinrichs, W. P. Encyclopaedia Islamica. Brill. The Kurds, an Iranian people of the Near East, live at the junction of more or less laicised Turkey. ... We thus find that about the period of the Arab conquest a single ethnic term Kurd (plur. Akrād) was beginning to be applied to an amalgamation of Iranian or iranicised tribes. ... The classification of the Kurds among the Iranian nations is based mainly on linguistic and historical data and does not prejudice the fact there is a complexity of ethnical elements incorporated in them.
^For Assyrians as indigenous to the Middle East, see
Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, p. 180
James Minahan, Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: A-C, p. 206
Carl Skutsch, Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities, p. 149
Steven L. Danver, Native Peoples of the World: An Encyclopedia of Groups, Cultures and Contemporary Issues, p. 517
UNPO Assyria
Richard T. Schaefer, Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society, p. 107
^James Minahan, Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: A-C, pp. 205–209
^For Assyrians speaking a Neo-Aramaic language, see
The British Survey, By British Society for International Understanding, 1968, p. 3
Carl Skutsch, Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities, p. 149
Farzad Sharifian, René Dirven, Ning Yu, Susanne Niemeier, Culture, Body, and Language: Conceptualizations of Internal Body Organs across Cultures and Languages, p. 268
Al-Hasakah also known as Al-Hasakeh, Al-Hasaka or simply Hasakah, is the capital city of the Al-Hasakah Governorate and it is located in the far northeastern corner of Syria. With a population of 188,160 residents in 2004, Al-Hasakah is among the ten largest cities in Syria and the largest in the governorate. It is the administrative center of a nahiyah ("subdistrict") consisting of 108 localities with a combined population of 251,570 in 2004.
Tell Abyad
Tell Abyad is a town and nahiya in Syria. It is the administrative center of the Tell Abyad District within the Raqqa Governorate. Located along the Balikh River, it constitutes a divided city with the bordering city of Akçakale in Turkey.
Democratic Union Party (Syria)
The Democratic Union Party or PYD is a Kurdish democratic confederalist political party established on 20 September 2003 in northern Syria. It is a founding member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change, and is described by the Carnegie Middle East Center as "one of the most important Kurdish opposition parties in Syria". It is the leading political party in the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria and its regions. Chemical engineer Salih Muslim became its chairman in 2010, and Asiyah Abdullah its co-chairwoman in June 2012.
People's Protection Units
The People's Protection Units or People's Defense Units is a mainly-Kurdish militia in Syria and the primary component of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria's Syrian Democratic Forces. The YPG is mostly ethnically Kurdish, and also includes Arabs, foreign volunteers, and is closely allied to the Syriac Military Council, a militia of Assyrians.
Kurdish National Council
The Kurdish National Council is a Syrian Kurdish political organization funded by the President of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani and Turkey in the Syrian Civil War. While KNC had initially more international support than the ruling Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the early years of the Syrian civil war and a strong supporter basis among some Syrian Kurdish refugees, the overwhelming popular support the PYD enjoys have shadowed it in Syrian Kurdistan.
Syriac Military Council
The Syriac Military Council is an Assyrian/Syriac military organisation in Syria. The establishment of the organisation was announced on 8 January 2013. According to the Syriac Military Council, the goal of the organisation is to stand up for the national rights and to protect the Assyrian/Syriac people in Syria. The organisation fights mostly in the densely populated Assyrian areas of Al-Hasakah Governorate.
Euphrates Region
Euphrates Region, formerly Kobanî Canton,, is the central of three regions of the de facto autonomous Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, factually comprising Ayn al-Arab District of the Aleppo Governorate, Tell Abyad District of the Raqqa Governorate, and the westernmost tip of Nahiya Ras al-Ayn of the Ras al-Ayn District of Al-Hasakah Governorate. Euphrates Region unilaterally declared autonomy in January 2014 and since de facto is under direct democratic government in line with the polyethnic Constitution of Rojava.
Jazira Region
Jazira Region, formerly Jazira Canton,, is the largest of the three regions of the de facto autonomous Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. As part of the ongoing Rojava campaign, its democratic autonomy was officially declared on 21 January 2014. The region was established on the Al-Hasakah Governorate formerly known as Al-Jazira Province of Syria.
Afrin Region
Afrin Region is the westernmost of the three regions of the de facto autonomous Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.
Women's Protection Units
The Women's Protection Units or Women's Defense Units is an all-female militia actively fighting in Northern Syria. The YPJ is one of two armed wings of the Democratic Union Party (Syria) (PYD), the other being the People's Protection Units militia, which includes both men and women. While the YPJ, and the PYD in general, is mainly associated with Kurds, the organization also includes other ethnoreligious groups of Northern Syria.
Constitution of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria
The Constitution of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, officially titled Charter of the Social Contract, is the provisional constitution of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Syria known as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS). It was adopted on 29 January 2014, when the Democratic Union Party (PYD), claiming to represent the DFNS population, declared the three DFNS regions it controls autonomous from the Syrian government. Article 12 states the DFNS remains an "integral part of Syria", tentatively implementing an expected future federal Syrian governance in Northern Syria.
Foreign relations of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria
The foreign relations of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria refers to the external relations of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS). The region, consisting of three regions was formed in early 2014 in the context of the Syrian Civil War, a conflict that has caused the involvement of many different countries and international organizations in the area.
Syrian Democratic Forces
The Syrian Democratic Forces, commonly abbreviated as SDF, HSD or QSD, is an alliance of Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian/Syriac militias, as well as some smaller Turkmen and Chechen participating in the Syrian Civil War. The SDF is militarily led by the People's Protection Units (YPG), a mostly Kurdish militia. Founded in October 2015, the SDF states its mission as fighting to create a secular, democratic and federal Syria. The updated December 2016 constitution of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria names the SDF as its official defence force.
Rojava conflict
The Rojava conflict, also known as the Rojava revolution, is a political upheaval and military conflict taking place in Northern Syria, known among Kurdish nationalists as Western Kurdistan or Rojava. During the Syrian Civil War that began in 2012, a Kurdish-dominated coalition led by the Democratic Union Party as well as some other Kurdish, Arab, Syriac-Assyrian and Turkmen groups have sought to establish a new constitution for the de facto autonomous region, while military wings and allied militias have fought to maintain control of the region. This led to the establishment of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS) in 2016. The supporters of the DFNS argue that the events constitute a social revolution with a prominent role played by women both on the battlefield and within the newly formed political system, as well as the implementation of democratic confederalism, a form of libertarian socialism that emphasizes decentralization, gender equality and the need for local governance through semi-direct democracy.
Human rights in the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria
The Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS), is a de facto autonomous region of Syria that emerged from 2012 onwards during the Syrian Civil War and in particular the Rojava conflict. The DFNS is formed of most of al-Hasakah Governorate and the northern parts of Raqqa Governorate and Aleppo Governorate. On 16 March 2016, the de facto administration of the DFNS declared the establishment of a federal system of government as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.
Descendants of Saladin Brigade
The Descendants of Saladin Brigade was a Free Syrian Army group active in the northern Aleppo Governorate. The group was supported by Turkey and was initially funded and armed by the United States, mainly fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant but also opposing the Syrian government and the Democratic Union Party's affiliates such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The brigade was largely disbanded by the Turkish Army in 2017, following disagreements over the participation in a planned Turkish-led offensive against Afrin Canton, although a small faction within the group remained active and participated in the offensive since January 2018.
Shahba Canton
The Shahba Canton is part of Aleppo Governorate, unilaterally declared part of Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS). The canton was established to administer the areas captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in the Aleppo Governorate west of the Euphrates, as part of the DFNS's Afrin Region.
Self-Defense Forces (DFNS regions)
Self-Defense Forces is a multi-ethnic territorial defense militia and the only conscripted armed force in the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. As a self-defense force, manpower for the HXP is recruited locally.
Northern Syria regional elections, 2017
The first Northern Syria regional elections were held on 1 December 2017. Local councils for the Jazira Region, Euphrates Region and Afrin Region were elected as well as for the subordinate cantons, areas and districts of the regions of Rojava. This followed the communal elections that were held on 22 September and will be followed by a federal parliamentary election of the Syrian Democratic Council, the region's highest governing body, initially scheduled for January 2018, but was later postponed.
Afrin Canton
Afrin Canton was one of the cantons of the de facto autonomous Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS). Syria's Afrin District fell under the control of the People's Protection Units (YPG) around 2012 and an "Afrin Canton" was declared in 2014. Afrin Canton in its latest form was established in 2017, however, as part of the reorganisation of the DFNS' subdivisions. With Afrin as its administrative centre, the canton was part of the larger Afrin Region. As a result of the Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch in early 2018, Afrin Canton became part of the Turkish occupation of Northern Syria.