The flag of Democratic Kampuchea, whose design was used by Khmer guerrillas since the 1950s with the building design varying
Communism (until 1981)
|Headquarters||Phnom Penh, Cambodia|
The Khmer Rouge (/
The Khmer Rouge army was slowly built up in the jungles of Eastern Cambodia during the late 1960s, supported by the North Vietnamese army, the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao. Despite a massive American bombing campaign against them, the Khmer Rouge won the Cambodian Civil War when they captured the Cambodian capital and overthrew the government of the Khmer Republic in 1975. Following their victory, the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan renamed the country as Democratic Kampuchea and immediately set about forcibly evacuating the country's major cities. The regime murdered hundreds of thousands of their perceived political opponents. Ultimately, the Cambodian genocide led to the deaths of 1.5 to 2 million people, around 25% of Cambodia's population.
The Khmer Rouge regime was highly autocratic, xenophobic, paranoid and repressive. The genocide was in part the result of the regime's social engineering policies. Its attempts at agricultural reform through collectivisation led to widespread famine while its insistence on absolute self-sufficiency even in the supply of medicine led to the death of many thousands from treatable diseases such as malaria. The Khmer Rouge's racist emphasis on national purity included several genocides of Cambodian minorities. Arbitrary executions and torture were carried out by its cadres against perceived subversive elements, or during genocidal purges of its own ranks between 1975 and 1978.
The regime was removed from power in 1979 when Vietnam entered Cambodia and quickly destroyed most of the Khmer Rouge's forces. The Khmer Rouge then fled to Thailand, whose government saw them as a buffer force against the Communist Vietnamese. The United States and China and their allies, notably the Thatcher government, backed Pol Pot in exile in Thailand, providing the Khmers with intelligence, food, weapons and military training. The Khmer Rouge continued to fight the Vietnamese and the new People's Republic of Kampuchea government during the Cambodian–Vietnamese War which ended in 1989.
The Cambodian governments-in-exile (including the Khmer Rouge) held onto Cambodia's United Nations seat (with considerable international support) until 1993, when the monarchy was restored and the name of the Cambodian state was changed from Democratic Cambodia to Kingdom of Cambodia. A year later, thousands of Khmer Rouge guerrillas surrendered themselves in a government amnesty.
In 1996, a new political party called the Democratic National Union Movement was formed by Ieng Sary, who was granted amnesty for his role as the deputy leader of the Khmer Rouge. The organisation was largely dissolved by the mid-1990s and finally surrendered completely in 1999. In 2014, two Khmer Rouge leaders, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, were jailed for life by a United Nations-backed court which found them guilty of crimes against humanity for their roles in the Khmer Rouge's genocidal campaign.
- 1 Name history
- 2 Ideology
- 3 Origins
- 4 Path to power and reign
- 5 Regime
- 6 Fall
- 7 Memorialization
- 8 See also
- 9 References
- 10 Further reading
- 11 External links
The term Khmers rouges, French for red Khmers, was coined by King Norodom Sihanouk and later adopted by English speakers (in the form of the corrupted version Khmer Rouge). It was used to refer to a succession of communist parties in Cambodia which evolved into the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and later the Party of Democratic Kampuchea. Its military was known successively as the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea.
In power, the movement's ideology was shaped by a power struggle during 1976 in which the so-called Party Centre led by Pol Pot defeated other regional elements of the leadership. The Party Centre's ideology combined elements of Marxism with a strongly xenophobic form of Khmer nationalism. Due in part to secrecy and changes in the government's presentation of itself, academic interpretations of its political position vary widely, ranging from interpreting it as the "purest" Marxist–Leninist movement to characterising it as an anti-Marxist "peasant revolution".
Its leaders and theorists, most of whom had been exposed to the heavily Stalinist outlook of the French Communist Party during the 1950s, developed a distinctive and eclectic "post-Leninist" ideology that drew on elements of Stalinism, Maoism and the postcolonial theory of Frantz Fanon. In the early 1970s, the Khmer Rouge looked to the model of Enver Hoxha's Albania which they believed was the most advanced communist state then in existence. Many of the regime's characteristics such as its focus on the rural peasantry rather than the urban proletariat as the bulwark of revolution, its emphasis on Great Leap Forward-type initiatives, its desire to abolish personal interest in human behaviour, its promotion of communal living and eating and its focus on perceived common sense over technical knowledge appear to have been heavily influenced by Maoist ideology. However, the Khmer Rouge displayed these characteristics in a more extreme form.
While the CPK described itself as the "number 1 Communist state" once it was in power, some communist regimes such as Vietnam saw it as a Maoist deviation from orthodox Marxism. The Maoist and Khmer Rouge belief that human willpower could overcome material and historical conditions was strongly at odds with mainstream Marxism, which emphasised materialism and the idea of history as inevitable progression.
One of the regime's defining characteristics was its Khmer ultranationalism, which combined an idealisation of the Angkor Empire (802–1431) with an existential fear for the survival of the Cambodian state, which had historically been liquidated during periods of Vietnamese and Siamese intervention. The spillover of Vietnamese fighters from the Vietnamese–American War further aggravated anti-Vietnamese sentiments as the 1960s went on: the Khmer Republic under Lon Nol, overthrown by the Khmer Rouge, had itself promoted Mon-Khmer nationalism and was responsible for several anti-Vietnamese pogroms during the 1970s. Some historians such as Ben Kiernan have stated that the importance the regime gave to race overshadowed its conceptions of class.
Once in power, the Khmer Rouge explicitly targeted the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Cham minority and even their partially Khmer offspring. The same attitude extended to the party's own ranks, as senior CPK figures of non-Khmer ethnicity were removed from the leadership despite extensive revolutionary experience and were often killed.
Khmer Rouge economic policy, based largely on the plans of Khieu Samphan, focused on the achievement of national self-reliance through an initial phase of agricultural collectivism. This would then be used as a route to achieve rapid social transformation and industrial and technological development without assistance from foreign powers, a process which the party characterised as a "Super Great Leap Forward". The strong emphasis on autarky in Khmer Rouge planning was probably influenced by the early writing of Samir Amin, who was cited in Khieu Samphan's PhD thesis.
The party's General Secretary Pol Pot strongly influenced the propagation of this policy. He was reportedly impressed with the self-sufficient manner in which the mountain tribes of Cambodia lived, which the party interpreted as a form of primitive communism. Khmer Rouge theory developed the concept that the nation should take "agriculture as the basic factor and use the fruits of agriculture to build industry". In 1975, Khmer Rouge representatives to China said Pol Pot's belief was that collectivisation of agriculture was capable of "[creating] a complete Communist society without wasting time on the intermediate steps". Society was accordingly classified into peasant "base people", who would be the bulwark of the transformation; and urban "new people", who were to be reeducated or liquidated. The focus of the Khmer Rouge leadership on the peasantry as the base of the revolution was according to Michael Vickery a product of their status as "petty-bourgeois radicals overcome by peasantist romanticism". The opposition of the peasantry and the urban population in Khmer Rouge ideology was heightened by the structure of the Cambodian rural economy, where small farmers and peasants had historically suffered through indebtedness to urban money-lenders rather than through oppression by landlords. The policy of evacuating major towns, as well as providing a reserve of easily exploitable agricultural labour, was likely viewed positively by the Khmer Rouge's peasant supporters as removal of the source of their debt.
Relationship to religion
Democratic Kampuchea is sometimes described as an atheist state, although its constitution stated that everyone had freedom of religion, or not to hold a religion. However, it specified that what it termed "reactionary religion" would not be permitted. While in practice religious activity was not tolerated, the relationship of the CPK to the majority Cambodian Theravada Buddhism was complex; several key figures in its history such as Tou Samouth and Ta Mok were former monks, along with many lower level cadres, who often proved some of the strictest disciplinarians. While there was extreme harassment of Buddhist institutions, there was a tendency for the CPK regime to internalise and reconfigure the symbolism and language of Cambodian Buddhism so that many revolutionary slogans mimicked the formulae learned by young monks during their training. Some cadres who had previously been monks interpreted their change of vocation as a simple movement from a lower to a higher religion, mirroring attitudes around the growth of Cao Dai in the 1920s.
The repression of Islam, practised by the country's Cham minority; and of adherents of Christianity was extensive. Islamic religious leaders were executed, although some Cham Muslims appear to have been told they could continue devotions in private as long as it could not interfere with work quotas. Nevertheless, Mat Ly, a Cham who served as the deputy minister of agriculture under the People's Republic of Kampuchea, stated that Khmer Rouge troops had perpetrated a number of massacres in Cham villages in the Central and Eastern zones where the residents had refused to give up Islamic customs.
Buddhist laity seem not to have been singled out for persecution, although traditional belief in the tutelary spirits, or neak ta, rapidly eroded as people were forcibly moved from their home areas. The position with Buddhist monks was more complicated: as with Islam, many religious leaders were killed whereas many ordinary monks were sent to remote monasteries where they were subjected to hard physical labour. The same division between rural and urban populations was seen in the regime's treatment of monks. For instance, those from urban monasteries were classified as "new monks" and sent to rural areas to live alongside "base monks" of peasant background, who were classified as "proper and revolutionary". Monks were not ordered to defrock until as late as 1977 in Kratié Province, where many monks found that they reverted to the status of lay peasantry as the agricultural work they were allocated to involved regular breaches of monastic rules. While there is evidence of widespread vandalism of Buddhist monasteries, many more than were initially supposed survived the Khmer Rouge years in fair condition, as did most Khmer historical monuments, and it is possible that stories of their near total destruction were propaganda issued by the successor People's Republic of Kampuchea. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that nearly 25,000 Buddhist monks were killed by the regime.
While François Ponchaud stated that Christians were invariably taken away and killed with the accusation of having links with the CIA, at least some cadres appear to have regarded it as preferable to the "feudal" class-based Buddhism. Nevertheless, it remained deeply suspect to the regime thanks to its close links to the French colonial power: Phnom Penh cathedral was razed along with other places of worship.
The history of the communist movement in Cambodia can be divided into six phases, namely the emergence before World War II of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), whose members were almost exclusively Vietnamese; the 10-year struggle for independence from the French, when a separate Cambodian communist party, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), was established under Vietnamese auspices; the period following the Second Party Congress of the KPRP in 1960, when Saloth Sar (Pol Pot after 1976) and other future Khmer Rouge leaders gained control of its apparatus; the revolutionary struggle from the initiation of the Khmer Rouge insurgency in 1967–1968 to the fall of the Lon Nol government in April 1975; the Democratic Kampuchea regime from April 1975 to January 1979; and the period following the Third Party Congress of the KPRP in January 1979, when Hanoi effectively assumed control over Cambodia's government and communist party.
In 1930, Ho Chi Minh founded the Communist Party of Vietnam by unifying three smaller communist movements that had emerged in northern, central and southern Vietnam during the late 1920s. Almost immediately, the party was renamed the Indochinese Communist Party, ostensibly so it could include revolutionaries from Cambodia and Laos. Almost without exception, all of the earliest party members were Vietnamese. By the end of World War II, a handful of Cambodians had joined its ranks, but their influence on the Indochinese communist movement as well as their influence on developments within Cambodia was negligible.
Viet Minh units occasionally made forays into Cambodian bases during their war against the French and in conjunction with the leftist government that ruled Thailand until 1947 the Viet Minh encouraged the formation of armed, left-wing Khmer Issarak bands. On April 17, 1950 (25 years to the day before the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh), the first nationwide congress of the Khmer Issarak groups convened and the United Issarak Front was established. Its leader was Son Ngoc Minh and a third of its leadership consisted of members of the ICP. According to the historian David P. Chandler, the leftist Issarak groups aided by the Viet Minh occupied a sixth of Cambodia's territory by 1952 and on the eve of the Geneva Conference controlled as much as one half of the country.
In 1951, the ICP was reorganized into three national units, namely the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP), the Lao Issara and the Kampuchean or Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP). According to a document issued after the reorganization, the VWP would continue to "supervise" the smaller Laotian and Cambodian movements. Most KPRP leaders and rank-and-file seem to have been either Khmer Krom, or ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia.
According to Democratic Kampuchea's perspective of party history, the Viet Minh's failure to negotiate a political role for the KPRP at the 1954 Geneva Conference represented a betrayal of the Cambodian movement, which still controlled large areas of the countryside and which commanded at least 5,000 armed men. Following the conference, about 1,000 members of the KPRP, including Son Ngoc Minh, made a Long March into North Vietnam, where they remained in exile. In late 1954, those who stayed in Cambodia founded a legal political party, the Pracheachon Party, which participated in the 1955 and the 1958 National Assembly elections. In the September 1955 election, it won about four percent of the vote, but did not secure a seat in the legislature. Members of the Pracheachon were subject to constant harassment and to arrests because the party remained outside Sihanouk's political organization, Sangkum. Government attacks prevented it from participating in the 1962 election and drove it underground. Sihanouk habitually labelled local leftists the Khmer Rouge, a term that later came to signify the party and the state headed by Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and their associates.
During the mid-1950s, KPRP factions, the "urban committee" (headed by Tou Samouth) and the "rural committee" (headed by Sieu Heng), emerged. In very general terms, these groups espoused divergent revolutionary lines. The prevalent "urban" line endorsed by North Vietnam recognized that Sihanouk by virtue of his success in winning independence from the French was a genuine national leader whose neutralism and deep distrust of the United States made him a valuable asset in Hanoi's struggle to "liberate" South Vietnam. Advocates of this line hoped that the prince could be persuaded to distance himself from the right-wing and to adopt leftist policies. The other line, supported for the most part by rural cadres who were familiar with the harsh realities of the countryside, advocated an immediate struggle to overthrow the "feudalist" Sihanouk.
Paris student group
During the 1950s, Khmer students in Paris organized their own communist movement which had little, if any, connection to the hard-pressed party in their homeland. From their ranks came the men and women who returned home and took command of the party apparatus during the 1960s, led an effective insurgency against Lon Nol from 1968 until 1975 and established the regime of Democratic Kampuchea.
Pol Pot, who rose to the leadership of the communist movement in the 1960s, was born in 1928 (some sources say 1925) in Kampong Thum Province, northeast of Phnom Penh. He attended a technical high school in the capital and then went to Paris in 1949 to study radio electronics (other sources say he attended a school for fax machines and also studied civil engineering). Described by one source as a "determined, rather plodding organizer", Pol Pot failed to obtain a degree, but according to Jesuit priest Father François Ponchaud he acquired a taste for the classics of French literature as well as an interest in the writings of Karl Marx.
Another member of the Paris student group was Ieng Sary, a Chinese-Khmer born in 1925 in South Vietnam. He attended the elite Lycée Sisowath in Phnom Penh before beginning courses in commerce and politics at the Paris Institute of Political Science (more widely known as Sciences Po) in France. Khieu Samphan was born in 1931 and specialized in economics and politics during his time in Paris. Hou Yuon (born in 1930) studied economics and law, Son Sen (born in 1930) studied education and literature and Hu Nim (born in 1932) studied law.
Two members of the group, Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon, earned doctorates from the University of Paris while Hu Nim obtained his degree from the University of Phnom Penh in 1965. Most came from landowner or civil servant families. Pol Pot and Hou Yuon may have been related to the royal family as an older sister of Pol Pot had been a concubine at the court of King Monivong. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary married Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith, also known as Ieng Thirith), purportedly relatives of Khieu Samphan. These two well-educated women also played a central role in the regime of Democratic Kampuchea.
A number turned to orthodox Marxism–Leninism. At some time between 1949 and 1951, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary joined the French Communist Party. In 1951, the two men went to East Berlin to participate in a youth festival. This experience is considered to have been a turning point in their ideological development. Meeting with Khmers who were fighting with the Viet Minh (and whom they subsequently judged to be too subservient to the Vietnamese), they became convinced that only a tightly disciplined party organization and a readiness for armed struggle could achieve revolution. They transformed the Khmer Students Association (KSA), to which most of the 200 or so Khmer students in Paris belonged, into an organization for nationalist and leftist ideas.
Inside the KSA and its successor organizations, there was a secret organization known as the Cercle Marxiste (Marxist circle). The organization was composed of cells of three to six members with most members knowing nothing about the overall structure of the organization. In 1952, Pol Pot, Hou Yuon, Ieng Sary and other leftists gained notoriety by sending an open letter to Sihanouk calling him the "strangler of infant democracy". A year later, the French authorities closed down the KSA, but Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan helped to establish in 1956 a new group, the Khmer Students Union. Inside, the group was still run by the Cercle Marxiste.
The doctoral dissertations written by Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan express basic themes that were later to become the cornerstones of the policy adopted by Democratic Kampuchea. The central role of the peasants in national development was espoused by Hou Yuon in his 1955 thesis, The Cambodian Peasants and Their Prospects for Modernization, which challenged the conventional view that urbanization and industrialization are necessary precursors of development.
The major argument in Khieu Samphan's 1959 thesis, Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development, was that the country had to become self-reliant and end its economic dependency on the developed world. In its general contours, Samphan's work reflected the influence of a branch of the dependency theory school which blamed lack of development in the Third World on the economic domination of the industrialized nations.
Path to power and reign
KPRP Second Congress
After returning to Cambodia in 1953, Pol Pot threw himself into party work. At first, he went to join with forces allied to the Viet Minh operating in the rural areas of Kampong Cham Province (Kompong Cham). After the end of the war, he moved to Phnom Penh under Tou Samouth's "urban committee", where he became an important point of contact between above-ground parties of the left and the underground secret communist movement.
His comrades Ieng Sary and Hou Yuon became teachers at a new private high school, the Lycée Kambuboth, which Hou Yuon helped to establish. Khieu Samphan returned from Paris in 1959, taught as a member of the law faculty of the University of Phnom Penh and started a left-wing French-language publication, L'Observateur. The paper soon acquired a reputation in Phnom Penh's small academic circle. The following year, the government closed the paper and Sihanouk's police publicly humiliated Samphan by beating, undressing and photographing him in public; as Shawcross notes, "not the sort of humiliation that men forgive or forget".
Yet the experience did not prevent Samphan from advocating cooperation with Sihanouk in order to promote a united front against United States activities in South Vietnam. Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim were forced to "work through the system" by joining the Sangkum and by accepting posts in the prince's government.
In late September 1960, twenty-one leaders of the KPRP held a secret congress in a vacant room of the Phnom Penh railroad station. This pivotal event remains shrouded in mystery because its outcome has become an object of contention and considerable historical rewriting between pro-Vietnamese and anti-Vietnamese Khmer communist factions.
The question of cooperation with, or resistance to, Sihanouk was thoroughly discussed. Tou Samouth, who advocated a policy of cooperation, was elected general secretary of the KPRP that was renamed the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK). His ally Nuon Chea, also known as Long Reth, became deputy general secretary, but Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were named to the Political Bureau to occupy the third and the fifth highest positions in the renamed party's hierarchy. The name change is significant. By calling itself a workers' party, the Cambodian movement claimed equal status with the Vietnam Workers' Party. The pro-Vietnamese regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) implied in the 1980s that the September 1960 meeting was nothing more than the second congress of the KPRP.
On July 20, 1962, Tou Samouth was murdered by the Cambodian government. At the WPK's second congress in February 1963, Pol Pot was chosen to succeed Tou Samouth as the party's general secretary. Samouth's allies Nuon Chea and Keo Meas were removed from the Central Committee and replaced by Son Sen and Vorn Vet. From then on, Pol Pot and loyal comrades from his Paris student days controlled the party centre, edging out older veterans whom they considered excessively pro-Vietnamese.
In July 1963, Pol Pot and most of the central committee left Phnom Penh to establish an insurgent base in Ratanakiri Province in the northeast. Pol Pot had shortly before been put on a list of 34 leftists who were summoned by Sihanouk to join the government and sign statements saying Sihanouk was the only possible leader for the country. Pol Pot and Chou Chet were the only people on the list who escaped. All the others agreed to cooperate with the government and were afterward under 24-hour watch by the police.
Sihanouk and the GRUNK
The region where Pol Pot and the others moved to was inhabited by tribal minorities, the Khmer Loeu, whose rough treatment (including resettlement and forced assimilation) at the hands of the central government made them willing recruits for a guerrilla struggle. In 1965, Pol Pot made a visit of several months to North Vietnam and China.
Pol Pot received some training in China, which had enhanced his prestige when he returned to the WPK's "liberated areas". Despite friendly relations between Norodom Sihanouk and the Chinese, the latter kept Pol Pot's visit a secret from Sihanouk. In September 1966, the party changed its name to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).
The change in the name of the party was a closely guarded secret. Lower ranking members of the party and even the Vietnamese were not told of it and neither was the membership until many years later. The party leadership endorsed armed struggle against the government, then led by Sihanouk. In 1967, several small-scale attempts at insurgency were made by the CPK but they had little success.
In 1968, the Khmer Rouge was officially formed and its forces launched a national insurgency across Cambodia. Though North Vietnam had not been informed of the decision, its forces provided shelter and weapons to the Khmer Rouge after the insurgency started. Vietnamese support for the insurgency made it impossible for the Cambodian military to effectively counter it. For the next two years, the insurgency grew as Sihanouk did very little to stop it. As the insurgency grew stronger, the party finally openly declared itself to be the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
The political appeal of the Khmer Rouge was increased as a result of the situation created by the removal of Sihanouk as head of state in 1970. Premier Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk with the support of the National Assembly. Sihanouk, who was in exile in Beijing, made an alliance with the Khmer Rouge and became the nominal head of a Khmer Rouge–dominated government-in-exile (known by its French acronym GRUNK) backed by China. Although thoroughly aware of the weakness of Lon Nol's forces and loath to commit American military force to the new conflict in any form other than air power, the Nixon administration announced its support for the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic.
On 29 March 1970, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive against the Cambodian army. Documents uncovered from the Soviet archives revealed that the invasion was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge following negotiations with Nuon Chea. A force of North Vietnamese quickly overran large parts of eastern Cambodia reaching to within 15 miles (24 km) of Phnom Penh before being pushed back. By June, three months after the removal of Sihanouk, they had swept government forces from the entire northeastern third of the country. After defeating those forces, the North Vietnamese turned the newly won territories over to the local insurgents. The Khmer Rouge also established "liberated" areas in the south and the southwestern parts of the country, where they operated independently of the North Vietnamese.
After Sihanouk showed his support for the Khmer Rouge by visiting them in the field, their ranks swelled from 6,000 to 50,000 fighters. Many of the new recruits for the Khmer Rouge were apolitical peasants who fought in support of the King, not for communism, of which they had little understanding. Sihanouk's popular support in rural Cambodia allowed the Khmer Rouge to extend its power and influence to the point that by 1973 it exercised de facto control over the majority of Cambodian territory, although only a minority of its population. Many people in Cambodia who helped the Khmer Rouge against the Lon Nol government thought they were fighting for the restoration of Sihanouk.
By 1975, with the Lon Nol government running out of ammunition, it was clear that it was only a matter of time before the government would collapse. On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh.
The relationship between the massive carpet bombing of Cambodia by the United States and the growth of the Khmer Rouge, in terms of recruitment and popular support, has been a matter of interest to historians. Some historians, including Michael Ignatieff, Adam Jones and Greg Grandin, have cited the United States intervention and bombing campaign (spanning 1965–1973) as a significant factor which lead to increased support for the Khmer Rouge among the Cambodian peasantry. According to Ben Kiernan, the Khmer Rouge "would not have won power without U.S. economic and military destabilization of Cambodia. ... It used the bombing's devastation and massacre of civilians as recruitment propaganda and as an excuse for its brutal, radical policies and its purge of moderate communists and Sihanoukists." Pol Pot biographer David P. Chandler writes that the bombing "had the effect the Americans wanted – it broke the Communist encirclement of Phnom Penh", but it also accelerated the collapse of rural society and increased social polarization. Peter Rodman and Michael Lind claimed that the United States intervention saved the Lon Nol regime from collapse in 1970 and 1973. Craig Etcheson acknowledged that U.S. intervention increased recruitment for the Khmer Rouge but disputed that it was a primary cause of the Khmer Rouge victory. William Shawcross wrote that the United States bombing and ground incursion plunged Cambodia into the chaos that Sihanouk had worked for years to avoid.
Owing to Chinese, U.S., and Western support, the Khmer Rouge-dominated Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) held Cambodia's UN seat until 1993, long after the Cold War had ended. China has defended its ties with the Khmer Rouge. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said that "the government of Democratic Kampuchea had a legal seat at the United Nations, and had established broad foreign relations with more than 70 countries".
The governing structure of Democratic Kampuchea was split between the state presidium headed by Khieu Samphan, the cabinet led by Pol Pot as prime minister and the party's own Politburo and Central Committee. All were complicated by a number of political factions existing in 1975. The leadership of the Party Centre, the faction headed by Pol Pot, remained largely unchanged from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. Its leaders were mostly from middle-class families and had been educated at French universities. The second significant faction was made up of men active in the pre-1960 party and who therefore had stronger Vietnamese links. However, government documents show that there were several major shifts in power between factions during the period in which the regime was in control.
In 1975–1976, there were several powerful zonal Khmer Rouge leaders who maintained their own armies and who came from a different party background to the Pol Pot clique, particularly So Phim and Nhim Ros, both vice presidents of the state presidium and members of the Politburo and Central Committee respectively. There was a possible military coup attempt in May 1976, led by a senior Eastern Zone cadre called Chan Chakrey, who had been made deputy secretary of the army's General Staff. A reorganisation of September 1976, which demoted Pol Pot in the state presidium, was later presented by the Party Centre as an attempted pro-Vietnamese coup. Over the next two years, So Phim, Nhim Ros, Vorn Vet and many other figures associated with the pre-1960 party would be arrested and executed. So Phim's execution would be followed by that of the majority of the cadres and much of the population of the Eastern Zone that he had controlled. The Party Centre, lacking much in the way of their own military resources, accomplished their seizure of power by forming an alliance with Southwestern Zone leader Ta Mok and Pok, head of the North Zone's troops. Both men were of a purely peasant background and were therefore natural allies of the strongly peasantist ideology of the Pol Pot faction.
The Standing Committee of the Khmer Rouge's Central Committee during its period of power consisted of the following:
- Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (died 1998), "Brother number 1", General Secretary from 1963 until his death in 1998 and effectively the leader of the movement.
- Nuon Chea (Long Bunruot) (died 2019), "Brother number 2", Prime Minister, arrested in 2007, high status made him Pol Pot's "righthand man" and sentenced to life in prison on 7 August 2014.
- Ieng Sary (Pol Pot's brother-in-law) (died in custody awaiting trial for genocide, March 14, 2013), "Brother number 3", Deputy Prime Minister and arrested in 2007.
- Khieu Samphan, "Brother number 4", President of Democratic Kampuchea, arrested in 2007 and sentenced to life in prison on 7 August 2014.
- Ta Mok (Chhit Chhoeun) (died July 21, 2006), "Brother number 5", Southwest Regional Secretary and final Khmer Rouge leader who died in custody awaiting trial for genocide.
- Son Sen (died 1997), "Brother number 89", Defense Minister, Superior of Kang Kek Iew and assassinated on Pol Pot's orders for treason.
- Yun Yat (died 1997).
- Ke Pauk (died 2002), "Brother number 13" and former secretary of the Northern zone.
- Ieng Thirith, (died 2015), sister-in-law of Pol Pot, former Social Affairs Minister and arrested in 2007, but deemed unfit to stand trial due to dementia in 2012.
Life under the Khmer Rouge
In power, the Khmer Rouge carried out a radical program that included isolating the country from all foreign influences, closing schools, hospitals and some factories, abolishing banking, finance and currency, and collectivising agriculture. Khmer Rouge theorists, developing the ideas of Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan, believed that an initial period of self-imposed economic isolation and national self-sufficiency would stimulate the rebirth of the crafts and the country's latent industrial capability.
Evacuation of the cities
In Phnom Penh and other cities, the Khmer Rouge told residents that they would be moved only about "two or three kilometers" outside the city and would return in "two or three days". Some witnesses said they were told that the evacuation was because of the "threat of American bombing" and that they did not have to lock their houses since the Khmer Rouge would "take care of everything" until they returned. People who refused to evacuate would have their homes burned to the ground and would be killed immediately. The evacuees were sent on long marches to the countryside, which killed thousands of children, elderly people and sick people. These were not the first evacuations of civilian populations by the Khmer Rouge as similar evacuations of populations without possessions had been occurring on a smaller scale since the early 1970s.
On arrival at the villages to which they had been assigned, evacuees were required to write brief autobiographical essays. The essay's content, particularly with regard to the subject's activity during the Khmer Republic regime, was used to determine their fate. Military officers and those occupying elite professional roles were usually sent for reeducation, which in practice meant immediate execution or confinement in a labour camp. Those with specialist technical skills often found themselves sent back to cities to restart production in factories interrupted by the takeover. The remaining displaced urban population ("new people"), as part of the regime's drive to increase food production, were placed into agricultural communes alongside the peasant "base people" or "old people". The latter's holdings were collectivised. Cambodians were expected to produce three tons of rice per hectare as before the Khmer Rouge era the average was only one ton per hectare. The total lack of agricultural knowledge on the part of the former city dwellers made famine inevitable. The rural peasantry were often unsympathetic, or were too frightened to assist them. Such acts as picking wild fruit or berries were seen as "private enterprise" and punished by death. Labourers were forced to work long shifts without adequate rest or food, resulting in a large number of deaths through exhaustion, illness and starvation. Workers would be executed for attempting to escape from the communes, for breaching minor rules, or after being denounced by colleagues. If caught, offenders were taken quietly off to a distant forest or field after sunset and killed. Unwilling to import Western medicines, the regime turned to traditional medicine instead and placed medical care in the hands of cadres given only rudimentary training. The famine, forced labour and lack of access to appropriate services led to a high number of deaths.
Khmer Rouge economic policies took a similarly extreme course. Trade was officially restricted only to bartering between communes, a policy which the regime developed in order to enforce self-reliance. Banks were raided and all currency and records were destroyed by fire thus eliminating any claim to funds. After 1976, the regime reinstated discussion of export in the period after the disastrous effects of its planning began to become apparent.
Commercial fishing was said to have been banned by the Khmer Rouge in 1976.
The regulations made by the Angkar also had effects on the traditional Cambodian family unit. The regime was primarily interested in increasing the young population and one of the strictest regulations prohibited sex outside marriage which was punishable by execution. In this as in some other respects, the Khmer Rouge followed a morality based on an idealised conception of the attitudes of prewar rural Cambodia. Marriage required permission from the authorities and the Khmer Rouge were strict in only giving permission for people of the same class and level of education to marry. Such rules were applied even more strictly to party cadres. While some refugees spoke of families being deliberately broken up, this appears to have referred mainly to the traditional Cambodian extended family unit, which the regime actively sought to destroy in favour of small nuclear units of parents and children.
The regime promoted arranged marriages, particularly between party cadres. While some academics such as Michael Vickery have noted that arranged marriages were also feature of rural Cambodia prior to 1975, those conducted by the Khmer Rouge regime often involved people unfamiliar to each other. As well as reflecting the Khmer Rouge obsession with production and reproduction, such marriages were designed to increase people's dependency on the regime by undermining existing family and other loyalties.
It is often concluded that the Khmer Rouge regime promoted illiteracy. This statement is not completely incorrect, but quite inaccurate. The Khmer Rouge wanted to "eliminate all traces of Cambodia's imperialist past", and previous culture was one of those. The Khmer Rouge didn't want their people to be completely ignorant, and primary education was provided. Nevertheless, their policies dramatically reduced the cultural inflow as well as Cambodian knowledge and creativity. Their goal was to gain full control on all the information that people received, and spread revolutionary culture among the masses.
Education in Democratic Kampuchea came to a "virtual standstill". Irrespective of central policies, most local cadres considered higher education useless and were suspicious of those who had received it. The regime abolished all literary schooling above primary grades, ostensibly focusing on basic literacy instead. In practice, primary schools in many areas were not set up due to the extreme disruption caused by the regime takeover, and most ordinary people, especially "new people", felt their children were taught nothing worthwhile in those schools that did exist. The exception was the Eastern Zone, run until 1976 by cadres who were closely connected with Vietnam rather than the Party Centre, where a more organised system seems to have existed as children were taught by teachers drawn from the "base people" from a limited number of official textbooks and were given extra rations.
Beyond primary education there were a number of technical courses taught in factories to students drawn from the favoured "base people". However, there was a general reluctance to get involved with further education in Democratic Kampuchea as in some districts cadres were known to kill people who boasted of educational accomplishments, and it was considered bad form to allude to any special technical training. Based on a speech made in 1978, it appears that Pol Pot may have ultimately envisaged that students from the approved poor peasant background could go from illiteracy to being trained engineers within ten years based on targeted study and a large proportion of practical work.
The Khmer language has a complex system of usages to define speakers' rank and social status. During the rule of the Khmer Rouge, these usages were abolished. People were encouraged to call each other "friend" (មិត្ត; mitt) and to avoid traditional signs of deference such as bowing or folding the hands in salutation, known as samphea.
Language was also transformed in other ways. The Khmer Rouge invented new terms. In keeping with the regime's theories on Khmer identity, the majority of new words were coined with reference to Pali or Sanskrit terms while Chinese and Vietnamese-language borrowings were discouraged. People were told to "forge" (lot dam) a new revolutionary character, that they were the "instruments" (ឧបករណ៍; opokar) of the ruling body known as Angkar (អង្គការ, The Organisation) and that nostalgia for pre-revolutionary times (chheu satek arom, or "memory sickness") could result in execution. Rural terms like Mae (ម៉ែ; mother) replaced urban terms like Mak (ម៉ាក់; mother).
Many Cambodians crossed the border into Thailand to seek asylum. From there, they were transported to refugee camps such as Sa Kaeo or Khao-I-Dang, the only camp allowing resettlement in countries such as the United States, France, Canada and Australia. In some refugee camps, such as Site 8, Phnom Chat, or Ta Prik, the Khmer Rouge cadres controlled food distribution and restricted the activities of international aid agencies.
Crimes against humanity
The Khmer Rouge government arrested, tortured and eventually executed anyone suspected of belonging to several categories of supposed "enemies", including the following:
- People with connections to former Cambodian governments, either those of the Khmer Republic or the Sangkum, to the Khmer Republic military, or to foreign governments.
- Professionals and intellectuals, including almost everyone with an education and people who understood a foreign language. Many artists, including musicians, writers, and filmmakers were executed including Ros Serey Sothea, Pan Ron and Sinn Sisamouth.
- Ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese, ethnic Thai and other minorities in the Eastern Highlands, Cambodian Christians (most of whom were Catholic and the Catholic Church in general), Muslims and senior Buddhist monks. The Roman Catholic cathedral of Phnom Penh was razed. The Khmer Rouge forced Muslims to eat pork, which they regard as forbidden (ḥarām). Many of those who refused were killed. Christian clergy and Muslim imams were executed.
- "Economic saboteurs" as many former urban dwellers were deemed guilty of sabotage due to their lack of agricultural ability.
- Party cadres who had fallen under political suspicion: the regime tortured and executed thousands of party members, including senior figures such as Hu Nim.
The Khmer Rouge established over 150 prisons for political opponents, of which Tuol Sleng, a prison holding purged Party cadres and their families, is the best known. According to Ben Kiernan, "all but seven of the twenty thousand Tuol Sleng prisoners" were executed. Examples of the Khmer Rouge torture methods can be seen at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. The museum occupies the former grounds of a high school turned prison camp that was operated by Khang Khek Ieu, more commonly known as Comrade Duch, together with his subordinates Mam Nai and Tang Sin Hean. The buildings of Tuol Sleng have been preserved as they were left when the Khmer Rouge were driven out in 1979. Several of the rooms are now lined with thousands of black-and-white photographs of prisoners that were taken by the Khmer Rouge.
On 7 August 2014, when announcing convictions and handing down life sentences for two former Khmer Rouge leaders, Cambodian judge Nil Nonn said there were evidences of "a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Cambodia". He said the leaders, Nuon Chea, the regime's chief ideologue and former deputy to late leader Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan, the former head of state, together in a "joint criminal enterprise" were involved in murder, extermination, political persecution and other inhumane acts related to the mass eviction of city-dwellers, and executions of enemy soldiers.
Number of deaths
According to a 2001 academic source, the most widely-accepted estimates of excess deaths under the Khmer Rouge range from 1.5 million to 2 million, although figures as low as 1 million and as high as 3 million have been cited; conventionally accepted estimates of deaths due to Khmer Rouge executions range from 500,000 to 1 million, "a third to one half of excess mortality during the period". However, a 2013 academic source (citing research from 2009) indicates that execution may have accounted for as much as 60% of the total, with 23,745 mass graves containing approximately 1.3 million suspected victims of execution.
Ben Kiernan estimates that 1.671 million to 1.871 million Cambodians died as a result of Khmer Rouge policy, or between 21% and 24% of Cambodia's 1975 population. A study by French demographer Marek Sliwinski calculated slightly fewer than 2 million unnatural deaths under the Khmer Rouge out of a 1975 Cambodian population of 7.8 million; 33.5% of Cambodian men died under the Khmer Rouge compared to 15.7% of Cambodian women. Researcher Craig Etcheson of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) suggests that the death toll was between 2 million and 2.5 million, with a "most likely" figure of 2.2 million. After five years of researching mass grave sites, he estimated that they contained 1.38 million suspected victims of execution. Although considerably higher than earlier and more widely accepted estimates of Khmer Rouge executions, "Etcheson argues that these numbers are plausible, given the nature of the mass grave and DC-Cam's methods, which are more likely to produce an under-count of bodies rather than an over-estimate." Demographer Patrick Heuveline estimated that between 1.17 million and 3.42 million Cambodians died unnatural deaths between 1970 and 1979, with between 150,000 and 300,000 of those deaths occurring during the civil war. Heuveline's central estimate is 2.52 million excess deaths, of which 1.4 million were the direct result of violence. Despite being based on a house-to-house survey of Cambodians, the estimate of 3.3 million deaths promulgated by the Khmer Rouge's successor regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), is generally considered to be an exaggeration; among other methodological errors, the PRK authorities added the estimated number of victims that had been found in the partially-exhumed mass graves to the raw survey results, meaning that some victims would have been double-counted. An additional 300,000 Cambodians starved to death between 1979 and 1980, largely as a result of the after-effects of Khmer Rouge policy.
Fearing a Vietnamese attack, Pol Pot ordered a pre-emptive invasion of Vietnam on 18 April 1978. His Cambodian forces crossed the border and looted nearby villages, mostly in the border town of Ba Chúc. Of the 3,157 civilians who had lived in Ba Chúc, only two survived the massacre. These Cambodian forces were repelled by the Vietnamese.
Due to several years of border conflict and the flood of refugees fleeing Kampuchea, relations between Cambodia and Vietnam collapsed by December 1978. On 25 December 1978, the Vietnamese armed forces along with the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, an organization that included many dissatisfied former Khmer Rouge members, invaded Cambodia and captured Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979. Despite a traditional Cambodian fear of Vietnamese domination, defecting Khmer Rouge activists assisted the Vietnamese and with Vietnam's approval became the core of the new People's Republic of Kampuchea. The new government was quickly dismissed by the Khmer Rouge and China as a "puppet government".
At the same time, the Khmer Rouge retreated west and it continued to control certain areas near the Thai border for the next decade. These included Phnom Malai, the mountainous areas near Pailin in the Cardamom Mountains and Anlong Veng in the Dângrêk Mountains.
These Khmer Rouge bases were not self-sufficient and were funded by diamond and timber smuggling, by military assistance from China channeled by means of the Thai military and by food smuggled from markets across the border in Thailand.
Place in the United Nations
Despite its deposal, the Khmer Rouge retained its United Nations seat, which was occupied by Thiounn Prasith, an old compatriot of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary from their student days in Paris and one of the 21 attendees at the 1960 KPRP Second Congress. The seat was retained under the name Democratic Kampuchea until 1982 and then under the name Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Western governments voted in favor of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea retaining Cambodia's seat in the organization over the newly installed Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea, even though it included the Khmer Rouge. In 1988. Margaret Thatcher stated: "So, you'll find that the more reasonable ones of the Khmer Rouge will have to play some part in the future government, but only a minority part. I share your utter horror that these terrible things went on in Kampuchea". On the contrary, Sweden changed its vote in the United Nations and withdrew its support for the Khmer Rouge after a large number of Swedish citizens wrote letters to their elected representatives demanding a policy change towards Pol Pot's regime.
Ramifications of the Vietnamese victory
Vietnam's victory was supported by the Soviet Union and had significant ramifications for the region. The People's Republic of China launched a punitive invasion of northern Vietnam but then retreated, with both sides claiming victory. China, the United States and the ASEAN countries sponsored the creation and the military operations of a Cambodian government-in-exile, known as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which included the Khmer Rouge, the republican KPNLF and the royalist ANS.
Eastern and central Cambodia were firmly under the control of Vietnam and its Cambodian allies by 1980 while the western part of the country continued to be a battlefield throughout the 1980s, and millions of land mines were sown across the countryside. The Khmer Rouge, still led by Pol Pot, was the strongest of the three rebel groups in the Coalition Government, which received extensive military aid from China, Britain and the United States and intelligence from the Thai military. Britain and the United States in particular gave aid to the two non-Khmer Rouge members of the coalition.
In an attempt to broaden its support base, the Khmer Rouge formed the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea in 1979. In 1981, the Khmer Rouge went so far as to officially renounce communism and somewhat moved their ideological emphasis to nationalism and anti-Vietnamese rhetoric instead. However, some analysts argue that this change meant little in practice because according to historian Kelvin Rowley the "CPK propaganda had always relied on nationalist rather than revolutionary appeals".
Although Pol Pot relinquished the Khmer Rouge leadership to Khieu Samphan in 1985, he continued to be the driving force behind the Khmer Rouge insurgency, giving speeches to his followers. Journalist Nate Thayer, who spent some time with the Khmer Rouge during that period, commented that despite the international community's near-universal condemnation of the Khmer Rouge's brutal rule a considerable number of Cambodians in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas seemed genuinely to support Pol Pot.
While Vietnam proposed to withdraw from Cambodia in return for a political settlement that would exclude the Khmer Rouge from power, the rebel coalition government as well as ASEAN, China and the United States, insisted that such a condition was unacceptable. Nevertheless, Vietnam declared in 1985 that it would complete the withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia by 1990 and it did so in 1989, having allowed the government that it had installed there to consolidate its rule and gain sufficient military strength.
After a decade of inconclusive conflict, the pro-Vietnamese Cambodian government and the rebel coalition signed a treaty in 1991 calling for elections and disarmament. However, the Khmer Rouge resumed fighting in 1992, boycotted the election and in the following year rejected its results. It now fought the new Cambodian coalition government which included the former Vietnamese-backed communists (headed by Hun Sen) as well as the Khmer Rouge's former non-communist and monarchist allies (notably Prince Rannaridh). A "Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation of Cambodia" was established by Khmer Rouge authorities in July 1994.
There was a mass defection from the Khmer Rouge in 1996, when around half of its remaining soldiers (about 4,000) left. A conflict between the two main participants in the ruling coalition caused in 1997 Prince Rannaridh to seek support from some of the Khmer Rouge leaders while refusing to have any dealings with Pol Pot. This resulted in bloody factional fighting among the Khmer Rouge leaders, ultimately leading to Pol Pot's trial and imprisonment by the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot died in April 1998. Khieu Samphan surrendered in December.
On 29 December 1998, leaders of the Khmer Rouge apologized for the 1970s genocide. By 1999, most members had surrendered or been captured. In December 1999, Ta Mok and the remaining leaders surrendered and the Khmer Rouge effectively ceased to exist. Most of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders live in the Pailin area or are hiding in Phnom Penh.
Cambodia has gradually recovered demographically and economically from the Khmer Rouge regime, although the psychological scars affect many Cambodian families and émigré communities. It is noteworthy that Cambodia has a very young population and by 2003 three-quarters of Cambodians were too young to remember the Khmer Rouge era. Nonetheless, their generation is affected by the traumas of the past.
Members of this younger generation may know of the Khmer Rouge only through word of mouth from parents and elders. In part, this is because the government does not require that educators teach children about Khmer Rouge atrocities in the schools. However, Cambodia's Education Ministry started to teach Khmer Rouge history in high schools beginning in 2009.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was established as a Cambodian court with international participation and assistance to bring to trial senior leaders and those most responsible for crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. It has been handling four cases since 2007. ECCC's efforts for outreach toward both national and international audience include public trial hearings, study tours, video screenings, school lectures and video archives on the web site. As of May 2018, cases against the former leadership of the Khmer Rouge regime for crimes including genocide and crimes against humanity remain ongoing.
After claiming to feel great remorse for his part in Khmer Rouge atrocities, Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), head of a torture centre from which 16,000 men, women and children were sent to their deaths, surprised the court in his genocide trial on 27 November 2009 with a plea for his freedom. His Cambodian lawyer Kar Savuth stunned the tribunal further by issuing the trial's first call for an acquittal of his client even after his French lawyer denied seeking such a verdict. On 26 July 2010, he was convicted and sentenced to thirty years. Many condemned the sentence as too lenient. Theary Seng responded: "We hoped this tribunal would strike hard at impunity, but if you can kill 14,000 people and serve only 19 years – 11 hours per life taken – what is that? It's a joke", voicing concerns about political interference. In February 2012, Duch's sentence was increased to life imprisonment following appeals by both the prosecution and defence. In dismissing the defence's appeal, Judge Kong Srim stated that "Duch's crimes were "undoubtedly among the worst in recorded human history" and deserved "the highest penalty available".
Public trial hearings in Phnom Penh are open to the people of Cambodia over the age of 18 including foreigners. In order to assist people's will to participate in the public hearings, the court provides free bus transportation for groups of Cambodians who want to visit the court. Since the commencement of Case 001 trial in 2009 through the end of 2011, 53,287 people have participated in the public hearings. ECCC also has hosted Study Tour Program to help villagers in rural areas understand the history of the Khmer Rouge regime. The court provides free transport for them to come to visit the court and meet with court officials to learn about its work, in addition to visits to the genocide museum and the killing fields. ECCC also has visited village to village to provide video screenings and school lectures to promote their understanding of the trial proceedings. Furthermore, trials and transcripts are partially available with English translation on the ECCC's website.
The Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide and Choeng Ek Killing Fields are two major museums to learn the history of the Khmer Rouge.
The Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide is a former high school building, which was transformed into a torture, interrogation and execution center between 1976 and 1979. The Khmer Rouge called the center S-21. Of the estimated 15,000 to 30,000 prisoners, only seven prisoners survived. The Khmer Rouge photographed the vast majority of the inmates and left a photographic archive, which enables visitors to see almost 6,000 S-21 portraits on the walls. Visitors can also learn how the inmates were tortured from the equipment and facilities exhibited in the buildings. In addition, one of the seven survivors shares his story with visitors at the museum.
The Choeng Ek killing fields are located about 15 kilometers outside of Phnom Penh. Most of the prisoners who were held captive at S-21 were taken to the fields to be executed and deposited in one of the approximately 129 mass graves. It is estimated that the graves contain the remains of over 20,000 victims. After the discovery of the site in 1979, the Vietnamese transformed the site into a memorial and stored skulls and bones in an open-walled wooden memorial pavilion. Eventually, these remains were showcased in the memorial's centerpiece stupa, or Buddhist shrine.
The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), an independent research institute, published A History of Democratic Kampuchea 1975–1979, the nation's first textbook on the history of the Khmer Rouge. The 74-page textbook was approved by the government as a supplementary text in 2007. The textbook is aiming at standardising and improving the information students receive about the Khmer Rouge years because the government-issued social studies textbook devotes eight or nine pages to the period. The publication was a part of their genocide education project that includes leading the design of a national genocide studies curriculum with the Ministry of Education, training thousands of teachers and 1,700 high schools on how to teach about genocide and working with universities across Cambodia.
Youth for Peace, a Cambodian non-governmental organization (NGO) that offers education in peace, leadership, conflict resolution and reconciliation to Cambodian's youth, published a book titled Behind the Darkness:Taking Responsibility or Acting Under Orders? in 2011. The book is unique in that instead of focusing on the victims as most books do, it collects the stories of former Khmer Rouge, giving insights into the functioning of the regime and approaching the question of how such a regime could take place.
While the tribunal contributes to the memorialization process at national level, some civil society groups promote memorialization at community level. The International Center for Conciliation (ICfC) began working in Cambodia in 2004 as a branch of the ICfC in Boston. ICfC launched the Justice and History Outreach (JHO) project in 2007 and has worked in villages in rural Cambodia with the goal of creating mutual understanding and empathy between victims and former members of the Khmer Rouge. Following the dialogues, villagers identify their own ways of memorialization such as collecting stories to be transmitted to the younger generations or building a memorial. Through the process, some villagers are beginning to accept the possibility of an alternative viewpoint to the traditional notions of evil associated with anyone who worked for the Khmer Rouge regime.
Radio National Kampuchea (RNK) as well as private and NGO radio stations broadcast programmes on the Khmer Rouge and trials. ECCC has its own weekly radio program on RNK which provides an opportunity for the public to interact with court officials and deepen their understanding of Cases.
Youth for Peace, a Cambodian NGO that offers education in peace, leadership, conflict resolution and reconciliation to Cambodian's youth, has broadcast the weekly radio program You Also Have A Chance since 2009. Aiming at preventing the passing on of hatred and violence to future generations, the program allows former Khmer Rouge to talk anonymously about their past experience.
All Cambodian television stations include regular coverage of the progress of the trials. The following stations feature special programming:
- Cambodian Television Network (CTN) (English/Khmer) maintains a special van at the court for live transmission of the proceedings.
- National Television Kampuchea (TVK) (Khmer).
- Apsara TV (English/French/Khmer) targets viewers in Europe, Australia and North America.
ECCC also uses various social media to update the development of the tribunal.
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Someth May was a young Cambodian [...] [who] recalls [...] when a party cadre addressed a crowd [amidst deportation]: "As you all know, during the Lon Nol regime the Chinese were parasites on our nation. They cheated the government. They made money out of Cambodian farmers. [...] Now the High Revolutionary Committee wants to separate Chinese infiltrators from Cambodians, to watch the kind of tricks they get up to. The population of each village will be divided into a Chinese, a Vietnamese and a Cambodian section. So, is you are not Cambodian, stand up and leave the group. Remember that Chinese and Vietnamese look completely different from Cambodians." Under the new regime, the Khmer Rouge declared that "there are to be no Chams or Chinese or Vietnamese. Everybody is to join the same, single, Khmer nationality. [...] [There is] only one religion – Khmer religion. Similarly, a survivor recalls a cadre saying: "Now we are making revolution. Everyone becomes a Khmer."
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Democratic Kampuchea was officially an atheist state, and the persecution of religion by the Khmer Rouge was matched in severity only by the persecution of religion in the communist states of Albania and North Korea, so there were no direct historical continuities with Buddhism into the Democratic Kampuchean era.
- Vickery, M. (1999) Cambodia 1975–82, 2nd ed, Silkworm, p. 191 ("The constitution of Democratic Kampuchea stated that everyone had fredom of religion, or freedom not to hold any faith, but that what it termed "reactionary religion" would not be permitted").
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As best as can now be estimated, over two million Cambodians died during the 1970s because of the political events of the decade, the vast majority of them during the mere four years of the 'Khmer Rouge' regime. This number of deaths is even more staggering when related to the size of the Cambodian population, then less than eight million. ... Subsequent reevaluations of the demographic data situated the death toll for the [civil war] in the order of 300,000 or less.
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|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Khmer Rouge.|
- The Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force
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- The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Cambodia
- Nuon Chea’s 570-page closing brief; his version of Khmer Rouge history.
- Cambodia Tribunal Monitor
- Khmer Rouge S21 art exhibition at Tuol Sleng from January 26, 2011 to April 26, 2011 by Peter Klashorst
- ព្យុហយាត្រាខួបទី១០ឆ្នាំ ថ្ងៃ៧មករា ១៩៧៩ ដល់ ១៩៨៩
Other online sources
- Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, a consortium of academic, philanthropic and non-profit organizations which provides free access to videos of the proceedings, relevant news and statements as well as an overview of each case
- Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) at Yale University offers a comprehensive set of resources on the Khmer Rouge and the tribunal including news updates, photographs, databases, literature, maps, overview of US involvement in the Cambodian war and genocide and links to other organizations
- Cambodian Genocide Project by Genocide Watch updates the development of the tribunal on the website
- Best Movies About Cambodia that you can watch online via Amazon Instant Video
- Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian Genocide from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
- Yale University: Cambodian Genocide Program
- Digital Archive of Cambodian Holocaust Survivors
- PBS Frontline/World: Pol Pot's Shadow
- Survivor of the killing fields describes her experience from the Deacon of Death
- Cambodia Tales: Khmer Rouge torture and killing paintings
- Khmer Rouge Tribunal Updates from Genocide Watch
- Genocide of Cham Muslims
- Prosecuting starvation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
- A Search For Justice by the Women Forced to Marry Strangers
- State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004)
- Documentation Center of Cambodia. Retrieved February 6, 2005.
- Chigas, George (2000). "Building a Case Against the Khmer Rouge: Evidence from the Tuol Sleng and Santebal Archives". Harvard Asia Quarterly. 4 (1): 44–49. Archived from the original on September 28, 2007. Retrieved February 10, 2006.